JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS VOL 18, NO 3, SEPTEMBER 1983 An Analysis of the Performance of Publicly Traded Venture Capital Companies John D. Martin and J. William Petty* Venture capital companies can be likened to mutual funds that make invest? ments in small, new businesses. However, investments made by venture capitalists are unique in several ways [2] : (1) usually five or more years are required for a new firm to become well enough established that a venture capitalist can liquidate an investment; (2) during the early years of an investment, there is no organized secondary market for its shares; (3) the new firm characteristically faces a high risk of failure; and (4) several infusions of capital are usually required be? fore the new enterprise becomes a going concern. Consequently, the investments made by the venture capital firm have long been considered to carry high risks as well as the potential for high returns. For this reason, venture capital firms ac? tively diversify, investing in a portfolio of individual projects. Thus, the risk and return attributes of the venture capitalist's diversified portfolio will not totally mirror those of its individual investments.
As the United States has moved from an industrial society to an information and high-technology society, new firm creations have become increasingly im? portant. In 1950, at the peak of the industrial society, 93,000 new firms were started. Most recently, new companies are being created at the rate of 600,000 per year [7] . In this environment, the amount of funds committed to venture capi? tal funds has expanded rapidly, suggesting that investors believe they offer an attractive risk-return opportunity. The objective of this paper is to assess empiri? cally the risk-return profiles of a group of publicly traded venture capital firms.1 Specifically, we compare the performance of investment in venture capital firms with two benchmarks: a sample of 20 mutual funds with a stated objective of maximum growth potential; and the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 stock market index.
I. Prior Studies of the Performance of Venture Capital

Companies
Only a few studies have assessed the performance of venture capitalists, largely because of the lack of data. Some observers contend that venture capital investments outperform investments in common stocks. For example, Patricof [8] maintains that:
. . . there are now enough performance records from the earliest venture pools to provide ten-year comparisons that suggest almost without exception, that venture capital investing has outperformed almost every other market?not to mention most managed funds.
Despite the strength of this claim, empirical support is lacking. In fact, Fast [3] provides evidence to the contrary. In a study of the life span of 18 venture capital groups, with all but two of these groups beginning after 1965, it was observed that one-half were no longer operating in 1976.
Studies by Rotch [10] 
II. Test Sample
The test sample consisted of 11 venture capitalists (eight SBIC's and three venture capital firms), 20 maximum capital-gains mutual funds, and the S&P 500 stock index. Various issues of Venture Capital [12] were the source of rates of return for the venture capital firms.
The selection of venture capital firms was severely restricted by the unavailability of data. Of 37 firms that appeared at some time during 1970-1980, only 17 firms had price data available spanning the test years, [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . These 17 firms were reduced to the final 11-firm sample because of inactive trading. Trading inactivity was evidenced both by an absence of prices for some months and by consecutive months for which no price change was recorded.2
The necessity for eliminating 26 of 37 companies and the short observation period means that our results are quite sample-specific. That is, they are totally reliant on the time period studied and on the firms for which data were available.
This condition introduces two potential sources of bias into the results. First, the firms studied were those that were in existence for the entire 1974-1979 period. Hence, a survivorship bias is necessarily inherent in the test sample. That is, the firms studied were in a sense the "best" of the venture capital firms. Certainly, the poorest performers went out of existence before the end of the period. Sec? ond, fluctuations in the price series observed for the venture capital firms were dampened somewhat by a lack of trading activity where no price change was observed. To reduce the impact on the performance comparisons resulting from months without price changes, the analysis was based on the compound annual rates of return. Thus, annual rates of return for the period 1974-1979 (six obser? vations per company) provide the basis for the tests that are described in the next section.3
The mutual fund data were acquired from the Wiesenberger investment company services [13] . Wiesenberger classifies mutual funds into five investment-purpose categories ranging from maximum capital gains to income funds. Owing to the presumption that investors in venture firms primarily seek capital gains, only "maximum-capital-gain" mutual funds were included in the sample. Within the classification, 20 funds were randomly selected to compare against the venture capital companies.
In addition to the venture capital-mutual fund comparisons, the return distri? butions of venture capital firms were compared with that of the "general mar? ket." Thus, annual returns for S&P's 500 stock index were also collected.
III. Assessing Investor Preferences
Two methods were used to compare investor preferences for venture capital firms, mutual funds, and the market portfolio index: (1) mean-standard deviation comparisons; and (2) a generalized form of stochastic dominance. The meanstandard deviation comparison methodology is well known in the finance litera? ture and its strengths and weaknesses as a tool for evaluating performance have been well documented [11] . Thus, a review of this method is unnecessary. How? ever, the general stochastic dominance method is relatively new to financial ap? plications [6] and will be presented informally. (A formal derivation of stochastic dominance is found in [5] ). Meyer provides a method for evaluating the prefer? ences of a "group" of investors defined by the upper and lower bounds on their Pratt [9]-Arrow [1] absolute risk-aversion coefficients. An investor group is de? fined using the notation, Uj(rL(x), ra(x)), where Uj is the set of all investors whose absolute risk-aversion coefficients fall between the lower bound on risk aversion, rL(x)y and the upper bound, rv(x). Meyer shows that if the expected utility of investment A is greater than the expected utility of investment B for investors of rL(x) and of r^x), then A is preferred to B by all investors in Uj(rL(x), rv(x)). This conclusion is true of an individual where risk aversion var? ies as long as it remains between rL and rv within the range of outcomes that x may assume.
3 The actual names of the venture capital firms and the mutual funds are provided in To visualize the choice of investor groups as defined by r(x)9 consider the following example. A risky investment comprised of a 50 percent return with probability one-half and a zero return with probability one-half is offered to each of six investors. The risk-aversion coefficients characterizing each investor's utility function, as well as the corresponding certainty equivalents for the risky investments, are presented in Table 1 . The risk-neutral investor has a risk-aver? sion coefficient of zero and a certainty equivalent for the risky investment equal to the investment's expected return of 25 percent. Investors four through six ex? hibit risk-averse behavior that is evidenced by their positive risk-aversion mea?
sures and the fact that their certainty equivalents for the risky investment are less than the expected return from the risky investment. In fact, investor number six is so risk averse that he would be just as happy to receive a 6.9 percent certain return as an expected return of 25 percent from the risky investment. Investors one and two exhibit risk-seeking behavior. These investors have certainty equiv? alents that exceed the expected return on the example investment.
One of the most attractive features of Meyer's technique is that investor groups can be varied widely by selecting various upper and lower bounds for r(x). In the tests performed in the present research, we chose to study the prefer? ences of the investor groups contained in Table 2 . Recalling the certainty equiva? lents presented in Table 1 , we believe that the limits placed on the r(x) contained in Table 2 represent a wide range of risk-aversion characteristics.4
IV. Performance Evaluation Results
The performance of the venture capital firms was compared to that of a sam? ple of 20 maximum capital-gains mutual funds and the S&P 500. These comparisons were made using both mean-standard deviation analysis and general sto? chastic dominance. The results of the first of these two analyses are contained in Table 3 where mean annual rates of return, standard deviations, and Sharpe's [11] (reward-to-variability) ratio are presented. Most of the mean-standard devia? tion comparisons were ambiguous, reflecting no clear dominance. However, two of the venture capital firms did provide returns that dominated the performance of the S&P 500; that is, these firms had a higher mean return for a given standard deviation or a lower standard deviation for a given mean return. Additionally, there are two cases where the market index outperformed the venture capital firms. In contrast, there was only one mutual fund with a mean return-standard deviation combination that dominated the market and one case where the market dominated a mutual fund. Both the venture capital firms and the mutual funds were ranked using Sharpe's reward-to-variability ratio. These results indicate that seven of the top ten firms were venture capital firms; however, two of the venture capital firms were ranked at the bottom (30th and 31st). In addition, the S&P 500 ranked between the 23rd and 24th firms.5 Note that we have not considered the possibility of combining the risky as? sets under consideration into portfolios. We will retain this restriction in our sto? chastic dominance tests. However, the restrictions surrounding the use of meanvariance comparisons will be avoided in the general stochastic dominance evaluation of the relative performance of venture capital firms versus mutual funds and the S&P 500.
The stochastic dominance tests of performance involved comparing each of the 11 venture capital firms individually with each of the 20 mutual funds and with the market index. These comparisons were made for each of the six investor risk classes. Thus, a total of 231 comparisons (11 X 21) were made/or each of the six investor preference groupings, or a total of 1386 performance compari?
sons.
The results of the venture capital firm versus mutual fund comparisons are summarized in Table 4 . These results can be interpreted as follows. When ven? ture capital firm number one was compared to each of the 20 mutual funds by the strong risk-seeking group (group 1), there were six mutual funds that were preferred to this venture capital firm. On the other hand, in the 14 remaining mutual fund comparisons, venture capital firm number one was preferred in 12 instances. The two mutual find comparisons not reflected in these reported results represent comparisons where neither venture capital firm number one nor the respective mutual funds were unanimously preferred by those investors contained in the strong risk-seeking group. Therefore, it is necessary that we report the "prefer mutual fund" and the "prefer venture capital firm" columns since a third possibility (no unanimous preference) also exists.
The bottom row in Table 4 contains the average percentage of the 220 (11 X 20) comparisons made for each risk class where the mutual fund was preferred to any one of the venture capital firms and a similar statistic reflecting those cases where a venture capital firm was preferred to a mutual fund. For example, the strong risk-seeking group preferred venture capital firms in 73 percent of the comparisons, as contrasted with only an 18 percent preference rate for mutual funds. The remaining 9 percent (100% -(73% + 18%)) represents the cases where the strong risk-seeking group was not unanimous in its preferences.
The results presented in Table 4 provide the basis for two important obser? vations. First, the predominance of the preferences of the risk-seeking investor groups for venture capital firms (an average of 70 percent preferred venture capi? tal firms versus 20 percent who preferred mutual funds) suggests that venture capital firms are indeed more risky investments than the mutual funds. For exam? ple, as already noted, venture capital firms were preferred over mutual funds by the strong risk-seeking investor group in 73 percent of the comparisons. In contrast, when the preferences of the strong risk-averse group are analyzed only 41 percent of the comparisons produced an unambiguous preference for the venture capital firms (with 44 percent preferring mutual funds). Second, it also should be emphasized that risk-averse investors at times preferred venture capital invest? ments to the mutual funds analyzed. In fact, across all groups of risk-averse in? vestors, venture capital firms were preferred over mutual funds in 51 percent of the comparisons. Perhaps even more informative is the fact that investors in the "slight" risk-averse group preferred the mutual funds in only 29 percent of the The last phase of the research compared the venture capital firms with the S&P's 500 Stock Index. The objective was to compare the return and risk attri? butes of a well-diversified portfolio of publicly traded equity securities with that of venture capital companies. The results of these comparisons are presented in Table 5 . The results are notably similar to the venture capital-mutual fund com? parisons with risk-seeking agents exhibiting a preference for the venture capital firms. As the degree of risk aversion increased, preferences switched to the mar? ket portfolio. The objective of this study has been to compare the return distributions of publicly traded venture-capital companies to mutual funds (with a maximum cap? ital gains objective) and the S&P's 500 Index. The findings indicate that venture capital firms are indeed more risky than either of the two standards of compari? son. However, this risk did not preclude even risk-averse investors from prefer? ring the return distributions of one or more venture capital firms over some of the mutual funds or the stock index.
Earlier, we noted the specific limitations of the test sample of publicly traded venture capital firms; specifically, the potential survivorship bias and the absence of trading activity. However, even given these limitations, the prefer? ence for venture capital investing observed here was striking. Further, no effort was made to form portfolios of the venture capital firms that would offer the possibility of improved performance. In addition, portfolios of venture capital firms in combination with mutual funds and individual stocks offer yet another potential source of improved performance.
